When information improves information security

Jens Grossklags, Benjamin Johnson, Nicolas Christin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

11 Scopus citations


This paper presents a formal, quantitative evaluation of the impact of bounded-rational security decision-making subject to limited information and externalities. We investigate a mixed economy of an individual rational expert and several naïve near-sighted agents. We further model three canonical types of negative externalities (weakest-link, best shot and total effort), and study the impact of two information regimes on the threat level agents are facing.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFinancial Cryptography and Data Security - 14th International Conference, FC 2010, Revised Selected Papers
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event14th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2010 - Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain
Duration: 25 Jan 201028 Jan 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6052 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference14th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2010
CityTenerife, Canary Islands


  • Bounded Rationality
  • Game Theory
  • Limited Information
  • Security Economics


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