TY - JOUR
T1 - Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round
AU - da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
N1 - Funding Information:
The Commission generally takes a pro-liberalization stance on trade issues. Individual trade commissioners have supported the instigation of a new round of trade liberalization negotiations more strongly than others. For instance, in 1996 the Commissioner for External Economic Relations, Leon Brittan, began a campaign for a Millennium Round with the support of the financial services industry. He even proposed creating a transatlantic free trade area despite opposition from a majority of member states owing to the likely impact such a deal would have on the agricultural sector (Agence Europe, 23 April 1997). During the Doha Round, from 2001 to 2004, two commissioners Pascal Lamy and Franz Fischler, came from countries with a defensive position and from July 2004 to 2008 Peter Mandelson and Mariann Fischer Boel from two countries with an offensive position on agricultural trade liberalization. With this variation on the Commission’s side, we should be able to assess whether this has an impact on the negotiating position taken by the Commission and on the Council–Commission relationship. As Conceic¸ão-Heldt (2010) shows, when commissioners come from countries with an offensive position on trade liberalization, the Council – Commission relationship becomes conflict-laden, if the Commission makes concessions that are considered by those states with a more defensive position on agricultural trade liberalization as going beyond the Council’s negotiating mandate.
PY - 2011/4
Y1 - 2011/4
N2 - During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.
AB - During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.
KW - Discretion
KW - Doha Round
KW - EU trade policy
KW - European Commission
KW - Principal-agent approach
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79957485114&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2011.551078
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2011.551078
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79957485114
SN - 1350-1763
VL - 18
SP - 403
EP - 419
JO - Journal of European Public Policy
JF - Journal of European Public Policy
IS - 3
ER -