Timing attack on NoC-based systems: Prime+Probe attack and NoC-based protection

Cezar Reinbrecht, Altamiro Susin, Lilian Bossuet, Georg Sigl, Johanna Sepúlveda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Scopus citations

Abstract

Many authors have shown how to break the AES cryptographic algorithm with side channel attacks; specially the timing attacks oriented to caches, like Prime+Probe. In this paper, we present two practical timing attacks on NoC that improve Prime+Probe technique, the P+P Firecracker, and P+P Arrow. Our attacks target the communication between an ARM Cortex-A9 core and a shared cache memory. Furthermore, we evaluate a secure enhanced NoC as a countermeasure against the timing attack. Finally, we demonstrate that attacks on MPSoCs through the NoC are a real threat and need to be further explored.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)556-565
Number of pages10
JournalMicroprocessors and Microsystems
Volume52
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2017

Keywords

  • Network-on-Chip
  • Security NoC
  • Timing attack
  • Timing side-channel attack

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