The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences

Florian Brandl; Felix Brandt; Warut Suksompong

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.028

The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences

Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Warut Suksompong

Informatics 18 - Associate Professorship of Algorithmic Game Theory

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11 Scopus citations

Abstract

Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences satisfies these properties, even when significantly weakening the required degree of strategyproofness.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	44-47
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	141
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.028
State	Published - 1 Apr 2016

Keywords

C6
D7
D8
Pareto-efficiency
Random dictatorship
Stochastic dominance
Strategyproofness

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10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.028

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title = "The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences",

abstract = "Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences satisfies these properties, even when significantly weakening the required degree of strategyproofness.",

keywords = "C6, D7, D8, Pareto-efficiency, Random dictatorship, Stochastic dominance, Strategyproofness",

author = "Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt and Warut Suksompong",

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AU - Brandt, Felix

AU - Suksompong, Warut

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N2 - Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences satisfies these properties, even when significantly weakening the required degree of strategyproofness.

AB - Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences satisfies these properties, even when significantly weakening the required degree of strategyproofness.

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KW - D7

KW - D8

KW - Pareto-efficiency

KW - Random dictatorship

KW - Stochastic dominance

KW - Strategyproofness

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.028

M3 - Article

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SN - 0165-1765

VL - 141

SP - 44

EP - 47

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences

Abstract

Keywords

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