TY - JOUR
T1 - The dynamics of voting ownership in lone-founder, family-founder, and heir firms
AU - Achleitner, Ann Kristin
AU - Kaserer, Christoph
AU - Kauf, Tobias
PY - 2012/6
Y1 - 2012/6
N2 - We examine ownership dynamics in listed founding-family firms over the period 1996-2008. In order to enlarge the understanding of persistence of ownership influence, we analyze determinants of change in the light of family-firm heterogeneity. We detect ownership decreases and increases, alike. A Large Drop of ownership (at least -2.5%) occurs 4 times as often as a Large Increase. The mean negative change is -3.1% (median 0.0%), positive changes average 0.6% (median 0.0%). Foremost, owner identity characteristics and management board participation of individual blockholders explain the likelihood of ownership dynamics. Specifically, Lone Founder Firms show the most dynamical ownership structures in all regression scenarios. Heir Firms have the most robust ownership structure and are - on average - majority controlled by a family. They are less likely to reduce their ownership influence. Family Founder Firms are only changing ownership when the family forgoes to comply with the blocking minority of 25% plus one share further. We interpret all results in the light of identity, agency, stewardship, and financial theory. Thereby, an unbalanced panel (2529 firm years) of founding-family firms listed in the German CDAX market index at Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) represents the empirical foundation.
AB - We examine ownership dynamics in listed founding-family firms over the period 1996-2008. In order to enlarge the understanding of persistence of ownership influence, we analyze determinants of change in the light of family-firm heterogeneity. We detect ownership decreases and increases, alike. A Large Drop of ownership (at least -2.5%) occurs 4 times as often as a Large Increase. The mean negative change is -3.1% (median 0.0%), positive changes average 0.6% (median 0.0%). Foremost, owner identity characteristics and management board participation of individual blockholders explain the likelihood of ownership dynamics. Specifically, Lone Founder Firms show the most dynamical ownership structures in all regression scenarios. Heir Firms have the most robust ownership structure and are - on average - majority controlled by a family. They are less likely to reduce their ownership influence. Family Founder Firms are only changing ownership when the family forgoes to comply with the blocking minority of 25% plus one share further. We interpret all results in the light of identity, agency, stewardship, and financial theory. Thereby, an unbalanced panel (2529 firm years) of founding-family firms listed in the German CDAX market index at Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) represents the empirical foundation.
KW - Corporate governance
KW - Family-founder firm
KW - Heir firm
KW - Individual blockholder
KW - Lone-founder firm
KW - Ownership dynamics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84861712586&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.02.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.02.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84861712586
SN - 1877-8585
VL - 3
SP - 79
EP - 96
JO - Journal of Family Business Strategy
JF - Journal of Family Business Strategy
IS - 2
ER -