Abstract
Under the Cardoso presidency (1995-2002), Brazil adopted a reactive and defensive posture on trade liberalization. However, when Lula da Silva came into power in 2003, Brazil took a more offensive and proactive position on the issue in creating the G-20 and putting forward proposals of its own. How can this shift in the Brazilian negotiating position be explained? The main argument is that under the Lula da Silva administration, Brazil's position in the Doha round primarily reflected domestic political constraints on multilateral trade cooperation. Three domestic dynamics shaped the national preference for Brazil: a heterogeneous governing coalition with a high number of veto players, divisions within the Workers' Party, and the demands of interest groups. This explanation is discussed on the basis of Brazil's negotiating position in WTO negotiations from 2003 to 2006.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 173-194 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | International Trade Journal |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2013 |
| Externally published | Yes |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities
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SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals
Keywords
- Brazil
- Doha round
- Lula da Silva
- WTO negotiations
- domestic constraints
- interest groups
- multilateral trade cooperation
- veto players
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