Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale

Martin Bichler; Stefan Schneider; Kemal Guler; Mehmet Sayal

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15

Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale

Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Mehmet Sayal

Informatics 18 - Chair of Decision Sciences und Systems

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Economies of scale and scope describe key characteristics of production cost functions that influence allocations and prices on procurement markets. Auction designs for markets with economies of scale are much less well understood than combinatorial auctions, they require new bidding languages, and the supplier selection typically becomes a hard computational problem. We suggest a bidding language for respective markets, and conduct computational experiments to explore the incremental computational burden to determine optimal solutions brought about by the need to express economies of scope for problems of practical size.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications - First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Revised Selected Papers
Pages	93-94
Number of pages	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15
State	Published - 2009
Event	1st Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications, AMMA 2009 - Boston, MA, United States Duration: 8 May 2009 → 9 May 2009

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume	14 LNICST
ISSN (Print)	1867-8211

Conference

Conference	1st Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications, AMMA 2009
Country/Territory	United States
City	Boston, MA
Period	8/05/09 → 9/05/09

Keywords

Economies of scale
Economies of scope
Procurement auctions
Volume discount auctions

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15

Cite this

Bichler, M., Schneider, S., Guler, K., & Sayal, M. (2009). Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale. In Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications - First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 93-94). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 14 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15

Bichler, Martin ; Schneider, Stefan ; Guler, Kemal et al. / Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale. Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications - First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Revised Selected Papers. 2009. pp. 93-94 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering).

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title = "Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale",

abstract = "Economies of scale and scope describe key characteristics of production cost functions that influence allocations and prices on procurement markets. Auction designs for markets with economies of scale are much less well understood than combinatorial auctions, they require new bidding languages, and the supplier selection typically becomes a hard computational problem. We suggest a bidding language for respective markets, and conduct computational experiments to explore the incremental computational burden to determine optimal solutions brought about by the need to express economies of scope for problems of practical size.",

keywords = "Economies of scale, Economies of scope, Procurement auctions, Volume discount auctions",

author = "Martin Bichler and Stefan Schneider and Kemal Guler and Mehmet Sayal",

year = "2009",

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language = "English",

isbn = "3642038204",

series = "Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering",

pages = "93--94",

booktitle = "Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications - First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Revised Selected Papers",

note = "1st Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications, AMMA 2009 ; Conference date: 08-05-2009 Through 09-05-2009",

}

Bichler, M, Schneider, S, Guler, K & Sayal, M 2009, Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale. in Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications - First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 14 LNICST, pp. 93-94, 1st Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, United States, 8/05/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15

Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale. / Bichler, Martin; Schneider, Stefan; Guler, Kemal et al.
Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications - First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Revised Selected Papers. 2009. p. 93-94 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 14 LNICST).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Bichler M, Schneider S, Guler K, Sayal M. Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale. In Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications - First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Revised Selected Papers. 2009. p. 93-94. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15

Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale

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