@inproceedings{c46097087fa946b8a07d2398bef85860,
title = "Security games with market insurance",
abstract = "Security games are characterized by multiple players who strategically adjust their defenses against an abstract attacker, represented by realizations of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, characterize its pure equilibria, and describe how the equilibria compare to established results. Simplifying assumptions include homogeneous players, fair insurance premiums, and complete information except for realizations of nature. The results add more realism to the interpretation of analytical models of security games and might inform policy makers on adjusting incentives to improve network security and foster the development of a market for cyber-insurance.",
keywords = "Externalities, Game theory, Market insurance, Protection, Security, Self-insurance",
author = "Benjamin Johnson and Rainer B{\"o}hme and Jens Grossklags",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_11",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783642252792",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
pages = "117--130",
booktitle = "Decision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings",
note = "2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011 ; Conference date: 14-11-2011 Through 15-11-2011",
}