SchedGuard++: Protecting against Schedule Leaks Using Linux Containers on Multi-Core Processors

Jiyang Chen, Tomasz Kloda, Rohan Tabish, Ayoosh Bansal, Chien Ying Chen, Bo Liu, Sibin Mohan, Marco Caccamo, Lui Sha

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Timing correctness is crucial in a multi-criticality real-time system, such as an autonomous driving system. It has been recently shown that these systems can be vulnerable to timing inference attacks, mainly due to their predictable behavioral patterns. Existing solutions like schedule randomization cannot protect against such attacks, often limited by the system's real-time nature. This article presents "SchedGuard++": a temporal protection framework for Linux-based real-time systems that protects against posterior schedule-based attacks by preventing untrusted tasks from executing during specific time intervals. SchedGuard++ supports multi-core platforms and is implemented using Linux containers and a customized Linux kernel real-time scheduler. We provide schedulability analysis assuming the Logical Execution Time (LET) paradigm, which enforces I/O predictability. The proposed response time analysis takes into account the interference from trusted and untrusted tasks and the impact of the protection mechanism. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our system using a realistic radio-controlled rover platform. Not only is "SchedGuard++"able to protect against the posterior schedule-based attacks, but it also ensures that the real-time tasks/containers meet their temporal requirements.

Original languageEnglish
Article number6
JournalACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 20 Feb 2023

Keywords

  • Linux containers
  • Logical Execution Time
  • Response time analysis
  • security

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