TY - GEN
T1 - Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity Markets
AU - Ahunbay, Mete Seref
AU - Bichler, Martin
AU - Knörr, Johannes
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Owner/Author(s).
PY - 2023/7/9
Y1 - 2023/7/9
N2 - According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex preferences. In many real-world markets, participants have non-convex preferences and the allocation problem needs to consider complex constraints. Electricity markets are a prime example, but similar problems appear in many real-world markets, which has led to a growing literature in market design.
AB - According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex preferences. In many real-world markets, participants have non-convex preferences and the allocation problem needs to consider complex constraints. Electricity markets are a prime example, but similar problems appear in many real-world markets, which has led to a growing literature in market design.
KW - electricity markets
KW - multi-objective optimization
KW - non-convex markets
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85168093922&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3580507.3597732
DO - 10.1145/3580507.3597732
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85168093922
T3 - EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
SP - 59
BT - EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
T2 - 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023
Y2 - 9 July 2023 through 12 July 2023
ER -