TY - JOUR
T1 - On the prevalence of framing effects across subject-pools in a two-person cooperation game
AU - Goerg, Sebastian J.
AU - Walkowitz, Gari
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to Mai Abdeen, Zeina Barakat, Mohammed Dajani, Hong Geng, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Shani Kuna, Jan Meise, Markku Verkasalo, and Chaoliang Yang for supporting the conduct of the experiments in Abu-Dis, Chengdu, Helsinki, and Jerusalem. We also wish to thank Andrea Ahlgrimm, Jeffrey Carpenter, Brian Cooper, Jieyao Ding, Marion Eberlein, Christoph Engel, Simon Gächter, Johannes Kaiser, Jan-Erik Lönnqvist, Julia Berndt, Reinhard Selten, Philipp Wichardt, Eyal Winter, and the participants of the ESA meetings in Hong Kong, Atlanta, and Shanghai, the IZA and Cologne-Bonn workshops on behavioral economics, both held in Bonn in 2006, and the Sino-German Summer School 2007 in Bonn for valuable comments and discussions. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged (SE 137/3-1).
PY - 2010/12
Y1 - 2010/12
N2 - In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.
AB - In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Framing of decision problems
KW - Methodology
KW - Subject-pool differences
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78449295171&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.joep.2010.06.001
DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2010.06.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:78449295171
SN - 0167-4870
VL - 31
SP - 849
EP - 859
JO - Journal of Economic Psychology
JF - Journal of Economic Psychology
IS - 6
ER -