TY - GEN
T1 - On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice
AU - Aziz, Haris
AU - Brandl, Florian
AU - Brandt, Felix
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2014, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Efficiency-no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off-and strategyproofness-no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by misrepresenting his preferences-are two cornerstones of economics and ubiquitous in important areas such as voting, auctions, or matching markets. Within the context of random assignment. Bogomolnaia and Moulin have shown that two particular notions of efficiency and strategyproofness based on stochastic dominance are incompatible. However, there are various other possibilities of lifting preferences over alternatives to preferences over lotteries apart from stochastic dominance. In this paper, we give an overview of common preference extensions, propose two new ones, and show that the above-mentioned incompatibility can be extended to various other notions of strategyproofness and efficiency in randomized social choice.
AB - Efficiency-no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off-and strategyproofness-no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by misrepresenting his preferences-are two cornerstones of economics and ubiquitous in important areas such as voting, auctions, or matching markets. Within the context of random assignment. Bogomolnaia and Moulin have shown that two particular notions of efficiency and strategyproofness based on stochastic dominance are incompatible. However, there are various other possibilities of lifting preferences over alternatives to preferences over lotteries apart from stochastic dominance. In this paper, we give an overview of common preference extensions, propose two new ones, and show that the above-mentioned incompatibility can be extended to various other notions of strategyproofness and efficiency in randomized social choice.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84908164404&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84908164404
T3 - Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
SP - 545
EP - 551
BT - Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence
PB - AI Access Foundation
T2 - 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014, 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2014 and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2014
Y2 - 27 July 2014 through 31 July 2014
ER -