TY - GEN
T1 - On popular random assignments
AU - Aziz, Haris
AU - Brandt, Felix
AU - Stursberg, Paul
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - One of the most fundamental and ubiquitous problems in microeconomics and operations research is how to assign objects to agents based on their individual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular random assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with other properties that have been considered in the literature on random assignments, namely efficiency, equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and strategyproofness.
AB - One of the most fundamental and ubiquitous problems in microeconomics and operations research is how to assign objects to agents based on their individual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular random assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with other properties that have been considered in the literature on random assignments, namely efficiency, equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and strategyproofness.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84892948890&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_16
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_16
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84892948890
SN - 9783642413919
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 183
EP - 194
BT - Algorithmic Game Theory - 6th International Symposium, SAGT 2013, Proceedings
T2 - 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2013
Y2 - 21 October 2013 through 23 October 2013
ER -