On popular random assignments

Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Stursberg

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

One of the most fundamental and ubiquitous problems in microeconomics and operations research is how to assign objects to agents based on their individual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular random assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with other properties that have been considered in the literature on random assignments, namely efficiency, equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and strategyproofness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 6th International Symposium, SAGT 2013, Proceedings
Pages183-194
Number of pages12
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2013 - Aachen, Germany
Duration: 21 Oct 201323 Oct 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume8146 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2013
Country/TerritoryGermany
CityAachen
Period21/10/1323/10/13

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