Nudge: Intermediaries' role in interdependent network security

Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro A. Cárdenas, John Chuang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security of the overall system. We study two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and costsubsidies (pay for effort).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAPPLIED COMPUTING 2010 - The 25th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Pages1879-1880
Number of pages2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event25th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2010 - Sierre, Switzerland
Duration: 22 Mar 201026 Mar 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

Conference

Conference25th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2010
Country/TerritorySwitzerland
CitySierre
Period22/03/1026/03/10

Keywords

  • internet service provider incentives
  • security economics

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