Nudge: Intermediaries' role in interdependent network security

Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro A. Cárdenas, John Chuang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security and trustworthiness of the overall system. We discuss two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and cost-subsidies (pay for effort).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTrust and Trustworthy Computing - Third International Conference, TRUST 2010, Proceedings
Pages323-336
Number of pages14
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event3rd International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, TRUST 2010 - Berlin, Germany
Duration: 21 Jun 201023 Jun 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6101 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference3rd International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, TRUST 2010
Country/TerritoryGermany
CityBerlin
Period21/06/1023/06/10

Keywords

  • Enhancing Trust and Security with End Users
  • Internet Service Provider Incentives
  • Security Economics

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