Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions

Felix Brandt, Markus Brill

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

29 Scopus citations

Abstract

While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial and resolute, i.e., single-valued, social choice function is manipulable, it was recently shown that a number of appealing irresolute Condorcet extensions are strategyproof according to Kelly's preference extension. In this paper, we study whether these results carry over to stronger preference extensions due to Fishburn and Gärdenfors. For both preference extensions, we provide sufficient conditions for strategyproofness and identify social choice functions that satisfy these conditions, answering a question by Gärdenfors [15] in the affirmative. We also show that some more discriminatory social choice functions fail to satisfy necessary conditions for strategyproofness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTARK XIII
Subtitle of host publicationTheoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge - Proceedings of the 13th Conference, TARK 2011
Pages136-144
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2011 - Groningen, Netherlands
Duration: 12 Jul 201114 Jul 2011

Publication series

NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Conference

Conference13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2011
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityGroningen
Period12/07/1114/07/11

Keywords

  • preference extensions
  • social choice theory
  • strategyproofness

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