Mechanism design and implementation theoretic perspective for interference coupled wireless systems

This article investigates the properties of social choice functions (SCFs) that represent resource allocation strategies for interference coupled wireless systems. The resources can be physical layer parameters such as power vectors or spatial streams. Strategy proofness and efficiency properties of SCFs are used to capture the properties of non-manipulability and Pareto optimality of resource allocation strategies, respectively. This article introduces and investigates the concepts of (strong) intuitive fairness and non-participation in interference coupled systems. The analysis indicates certain inherent limitations when designing strategy proof and efficient resource allocation strategies, if additional desirable and intuitive properties are imposed. These restrictions are investigated in an analytical mechanism design framework for interference coupled wireless systems. The article also investigates the permissible SCFs, which can be implemented by a mechanism in either Nash equilibrium or dominant strategy for utility functions representing interference coupled wireless systems. Among other results, it is shown that a strategy proof and efficient resource allocation strategy cannot simultaneously satisfy continuity and the often encountered property of non-participation.