Linear payment rules for combinatorial exchanges

Martin Bichler, Vladimir Fux, Jacob Goeree

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Internet technology has led to an increasing number of two-sided markets with many buyers and sellers involved. In many of these markets there is a need for package bids such that bidders can express preferences for sets of objects which might be complements or substitutes. Such combinatorial markets have found wide-spread application. There is a substantial literature in IS and other disciplines on payment rules in single-sided combinatorial auctions. However, payment rules for two-sided combinatorial auctions (aka. combinatorial exchanges) are largely unexplored. Linear and anonymous competitive equilibrium prices are desirable but unfortunately they do not always exist in non-convex markets. We discuss the market design for a large-scale combinatorial exchange for fishery access rights. The specifics of the allocation problem lead to different ways how linear and anonymous prices can be computed. We analyze trade-offs of different payment rules relevant to an auction designer.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2016 International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2016
PublisherAssociation for Information Systems
ISBN (Electronic)9780996683135
StatePublished - 2016
Event2016 International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2016 - Dublin, Ireland
Duration: 11 Dec 201614 Dec 2016

Publication series

Name2016 International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2016

Conference

Conference2016 International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2016
Country/TerritoryIreland
CityDublin
Period11/12/1614/12/16

Keywords

  • Combinatorial exchange
  • Multi-object auctions
  • Payment rules

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