@inproceedings{0bb466474f4440e4aeb69bea9db4c81b,
title = "Linear payment rules for combinatorial exchanges",
abstract = "Internet technology has led to an increasing number of two-sided markets with many buyers and sellers involved. In many of these markets there is a need for package bids such that bidders can express preferences for sets of objects which might be complements or substitutes. Such combinatorial markets have found wide-spread application. There is a substantial literature in IS and other disciplines on payment rules in single-sided combinatorial auctions. However, payment rules for two-sided combinatorial auctions (aka. combinatorial exchanges) are largely unexplored. Linear and anonymous competitive equilibrium prices are desirable but unfortunately they do not always exist in non-convex markets. We discuss the market design for a large-scale combinatorial exchange for fishery access rights. The specifics of the allocation problem lead to different ways how linear and anonymous prices can be computed. We analyze trade-offs of different payment rules relevant to an auction designer.",
keywords = "Combinatorial exchange, Multi-object auctions, Payment rules",
author = "Martin Bichler and Vladimir Fux and Jacob Goeree",
year = "2016",
language = "English",
series = "2016 International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2016",
publisher = "Association for Information Systems",
booktitle = "2016 International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2016",
note = "2016 International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2016 ; Conference date: 11-12-2016 Through 14-12-2016",
}