TY - JOUR
T1 - LIGA
T2 - a cryptosystem based on the hardness of rank-metric list and interleaved decoding
AU - Renner, Julian
AU - Puchinger, Sven
AU - Wachter-Zeh, Antonia
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s).
PY - 2021/6
Y1 - 2021/6
N2 - We propose the new rank-metric code-based cryptosystem LIGA which is based on the hardness of list decoding and interleaved decoding of Gabidulin codes. LIGA is an improved variant of the Faure–Loidreau (FL) system, which was broken in a structural attack by Gaborit, Otmani, and Talé Kalachi (GOT, 2018). We keep the FL encryption and decryption algorithms, but modify the insecure key generation algorithm. Our crucial observation is that the GOT attack is equivalent to decoding an interleaved Gabidulin code. The new key generation algorithm constructs public keys for which all polynomial-time interleaved decoders fail—hence LIGA resists the GOT attack. We also prove that the public-key encryption version of LIGA is IND-CPA secure in the standard model and the key encapsulation mechanisms version is IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model, both under hardness assumptions of formally defined problems related to list decoding and interleaved decoding of Gabidulin codes. We propose and analyze various exponential-time attacks on these problems, calculate their work factors, and compare the resulting parameters to NIST proposals. The strengths of LIGA are short ciphertext sizes and (relatively) small key sizes. Further, LIGA guarantees correct decryption and has no decryption failure rate. It is not based on hiding the structure of a code. Since there are efficient and constant-time algorithms for encoding and decoding Gabidulin codes, timing attacks on the encryption and decryption algorithms can be easily prevented.
AB - We propose the new rank-metric code-based cryptosystem LIGA which is based on the hardness of list decoding and interleaved decoding of Gabidulin codes. LIGA is an improved variant of the Faure–Loidreau (FL) system, which was broken in a structural attack by Gaborit, Otmani, and Talé Kalachi (GOT, 2018). We keep the FL encryption and decryption algorithms, but modify the insecure key generation algorithm. Our crucial observation is that the GOT attack is equivalent to decoding an interleaved Gabidulin code. The new key generation algorithm constructs public keys for which all polynomial-time interleaved decoders fail—hence LIGA resists the GOT attack. We also prove that the public-key encryption version of LIGA is IND-CPA secure in the standard model and the key encapsulation mechanisms version is IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model, both under hardness assumptions of formally defined problems related to list decoding and interleaved decoding of Gabidulin codes. We propose and analyze various exponential-time attacks on these problems, calculate their work factors, and compare the resulting parameters to NIST proposals. The strengths of LIGA are short ciphertext sizes and (relatively) small key sizes. Further, LIGA guarantees correct decryption and has no decryption failure rate. It is not based on hiding the structure of a code. Since there are efficient and constant-time algorithms for encoding and decoding Gabidulin codes, timing attacks on the encryption and decryption algorithms can be easily prevented.
KW - Code-based cryptography
KW - Gabidulin codes
KW - Interleaved decoding
KW - List decoding
KW - Rank-metric codes
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85104848555&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10623-021-00861-z
DO - 10.1007/s10623-021-00861-z
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85104848555
SN - 0925-1022
VL - 89
SP - 1279
EP - 1319
JO - Designs, Codes, and Cryptography
JF - Designs, Codes, and Cryptography
IS - 6
ER -