TY - GEN
T1 - Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice
AU - Brandl, Florian
AU - Brandt, Felix
AU - Hofbauer, Johannes
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Voting rules are powerful tools that allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. A common flaw of some voting rules, known as the no-show paradox, is that agents may obtain a more preferred outcome by abstaining an election. Whenever a rule does not suffer from this paradox, it is said to satisfy participation. In this paper, we initiate the study of participation in probabilistic social choice, i.e., for voting rules that yield probability distributions over alternatives. We consider three degrees of participation based on expected utility, the strongest of which even requires that an agent is strictly better off by participating at an election. While the latter condition is prohibitive in non-probabilistic social choice, we show that it can be met by reasonable probabilistic functions. More generally, we study to which extent participation and Pareto efficiency are compatible. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in this direction.
AB - Voting rules are powerful tools that allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. A common flaw of some voting rules, known as the no-show paradox, is that agents may obtain a more preferred outcome by abstaining an election. Whenever a rule does not suffer from this paradox, it is said to satisfy participation. In this paper, we initiate the study of participation in probabilistic social choice, i.e., for voting rules that yield probability distributions over alternatives. We consider three degrees of participation based on expected utility, the strongest of which even requires that an agent is strictly better off by participating at an election. While the latter condition is prohibitive in non-probabilistic social choice, we show that it can be met by reasonable probabilistic functions. More generally, we study to which extent participation and Pareto efficiency are compatible. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in this direction.
KW - No-show paradox
KW - Pareto-optimality
KW - Randomization
KW - Stochastic dominance
KW - Strategic manipulation
KW - Voting theory
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84944681749&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84944681749
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 1411
EP - 1419
BT - AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
A2 - Bordini, Rafael H.
A2 - Yolum, Pinar
A2 - Elkind, Edith
A2 - Weiss, Gerhard
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
T2 - 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
Y2 - 4 May 2015 through 8 May 2015
ER -