TY - GEN
T1 - FuLeeca
T2 - 11th International Workshop on Code-Based Cryptography, CBCrypto 2023
AU - Ritterhoff, Stefan
AU - Maringer, Georg
AU - Bitzer, Sebastian
AU - Weger, Violetta
AU - Karl, Patrick
AU - Schamberger, Thomas
AU - Schupp, Jonas
AU - Wachter-Zeh, Antonia
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - In this work, we introduce a new code-based signature scheme, called FuLeeca, based on the NP-hard problem of finding codewords of given Lee-weight. The scheme follows the Hash-and-Sign approach applied to quasi-cyclic codes. Similar approaches in the Hamming metric have suffered statistical attacks, which revealed the small support of the secret basis. Using the Lee metric, we are able to thwart such attacks. We use existing hardness results on the underlying problem and study adapted statistical attacks. We propose parameters for FuLeeca and compare them to an extensive list of proposed post-quantum secure signature schemes including the ones already standardized by NIST. This comparison reveals that FuLeeca is competitive. For example, for NIST category I, i.e., 160 bit of classical security, we obtain an average signature size of 1100 bytes and public key sizes of 1318 bytes. Comparing the total communication cost, i.e., the sum of the signature and public key size, we see that FuLeeca is only outperformed by Falcon while the other standardized schemes Dilithium and SPHINCS+ show higher communication costs than FuLeeca.
AB - In this work, we introduce a new code-based signature scheme, called FuLeeca, based on the NP-hard problem of finding codewords of given Lee-weight. The scheme follows the Hash-and-Sign approach applied to quasi-cyclic codes. Similar approaches in the Hamming metric have suffered statistical attacks, which revealed the small support of the secret basis. Using the Lee metric, we are able to thwart such attacks. We use existing hardness results on the underlying problem and study adapted statistical attacks. We propose parameters for FuLeeca and compare them to an extensive list of proposed post-quantum secure signature schemes including the ones already standardized by NIST. This comparison reveals that FuLeeca is competitive. For example, for NIST category I, i.e., 160 bit of classical security, we obtain an average signature size of 1100 bytes and public key sizes of 1318 bytes. Comparing the total communication cost, i.e., the sum of the signature and public key size, we see that FuLeeca is only outperformed by Falcon while the other standardized schemes Dilithium and SPHINCS+ show higher communication costs than FuLeeca.
KW - Code-Based cryptography
KW - Lee metric
KW - Post-Quantum cryptography
KW - Signature scheme
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85177450728&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-46495-9_4
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-46495-9_4
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85177450728
SN - 9783031464942
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 56
EP - 83
BT - Code-Based Cryptography - 11th International Workshop, CBCrypto 2023, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Esser, Andre
A2 - Santini, Paolo
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Y2 - 22 April 2023 through 23 April 2023
ER -