Frontiers in spectrum auction design

Martin Bichler; Jacob K. Goeree

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.006

Frontiers in spectrum auction design

Martin Bichler, Jacob K. Goeree

Informatics 18 - Chair of Decision Sciences und Systems

Technical University of Munich

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Spectrum auction design has seen number innovations in the recent years. Regulators have used various types of combinatorial auction formats including simple ascending combinatorial clock auctions and first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. The Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) and the two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) are the most wide-spread auction formats for spectrum sales to date. We provide an accessible overview of strategic problems in these auction formats and summarize research challenges in this field for a broader audience of readers in industrial organization.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	372-391
Number of pages	20
Journal	International Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume	50
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.006
State	Published - 1 Jan 2017

Keywords

Auction theory
Market design
Spectrum auction

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10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.006

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abstract = "Spectrum auction design has seen number innovations in the recent years. Regulators have used various types of combinatorial auction formats including simple ascending combinatorial clock auctions and first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. The Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) and the two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) are the most wide-spread auction formats for spectrum sales to date. We provide an accessible overview of strategic problems in these auction formats and summarize research challenges in this field for a broader audience of readers in industrial organization.",

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KW - Market design

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ER -

Frontiers in spectrum auction design

Abstract

Keywords

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