TY - JOUR
T1 - Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games
AU - Goerg, Sebastian J.
AU - Selten, Reinhard
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged. In addition we would like to thank Jordi Brandts and two anonymous referees for providing very helpfull comments.
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - We experimentally test the predictive success of three stationary concepts in two cyclic duopoly games. The concepts are Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. In the experiment 11 independent subject groups, consisting out of six participants interacting over 200 rounds, were gathered for each game. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In addition the data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.
AB - We experimentally test the predictive success of three stationary concepts in two cyclic duopoly games. The concepts are Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. In the experiment 11 independent subject groups, consisting out of six participants interacting over 200 rounds, were gathered for each game. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In addition the data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.
KW - Cyclic game duopoly experiment
KW - Impulse-balance equilibrium
KW - Payoff-sampling equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70349804903&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10683-009-9218-8
DO - 10.1007/s10683-009-9218-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:70349804903
SN - 1386-4157
VL - 12
SP - 253
EP - 271
JO - Experimental Economics
JF - Experimental Economics
IS - 3
ER -