Do teams procrastinate? Strategic procrastination in a dynamic environment

Sebastian J. Goerg, Sebastian Kube, Jonas Radbruch, Philipp Weinschenk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We experimentally study strategic procrastination in a dynamic team environment. Two team members work for a finite number of periods on a joint project. The project's success probability depends on the effort provided by both group members. Payment is conditional on finishing the project successfully. Between treatments, we vary whether both agents are free to choose their effort level or only a single agent can do so. If only one agent can choose effort, the effort of the other member is exogenously fixed; either to providing effort only shortly before the deadline or to providing effort in all periods. While in the former case we observe some effort patterns that resemble rational procrastination, the results from the other two treatments suggest that this seems to be caused by other-regarding concerns rather than being due to the strategic motives inherent in the mechanics of rational procrastination models.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)229-250
Number of pages22
JournalResearch in Experimental Economics
Volume19
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Dynamic team environment
  • Effort
  • Incentives
  • Rational procrastination

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