Differential Power Analysis Attacks from an Information-Theoretic Perspective

Andrea Grigorescu, Holger Boche

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Differential power analysis (DPA) attacks exploit the variance in power measurements of cryptographic devices to recover secret keys. What can an adversary achieve with power measurements? In this work, information-theoretic tools are used to quantity the amount of sensitive information revealed by a power measurement. It is shown that in order to find a secret key, an adversary needs to try a number of different keys. The number is exponential to the key size and the exponent is given by the key's entropy, conditioned on the power measurement.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2019 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538669006
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2019
Event2019 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2019 - Visby, Sweden
Duration: 25 Aug 201928 Aug 2019

Publication series

Name2019 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2019

Conference

Conference2019 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2019
Country/TerritorySweden
CityVisby
Period25/08/1928/08/19

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