Abstract
Philip Pettit has come to the aid of deliberative democrats, helping them clarify their arguments and improve their position. I am no ‘genuine’ deliberative democrat, so I cannot say for sure whether they will in general accept his republican solution to the discursive dilemma. Instead, I would like to explore the differences and similarities of this solution to the approach of constitutional economics. First, I will have a short look at the differences between deliberative democrats and economists in general. I am then going to discuss some advantages of constitutional economics over ‘ordinary’ neoclassical economics before turning to the similarities of Pettit’s approach to constitutional economics. Finally, I will-despite my initial carefulness on this matter-come back to the question of whether the republican solution presented is really acceptable for deliberative democrats. I doubt this. But in any case, I am going to argue that constitutional economists can accept nearly all of this solution.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Deliberation and Decision |
Subtitle of host publication | Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 113-118 |
Number of pages | 6 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351945509 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780754623588 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |