Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging

Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl, Matthias Oberlechner

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Numerous games studied in microeconomic theory, such as auctions and contests, are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. However, explicit solutions in the form of Bayes-Nash equilibria for such games are only known under highly specific assumptions regarding the agents' prior distributions or utility functions. Given the continuous nature of these games, existing equilibrium solvers cannot be straightforwardly applied and necessitate an additional discretization step.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages294
Number of pages1
ISBN (Electronic)9798400701047
DOIs
StatePublished - 9 Jul 2023
Event24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: 9 Jul 202312 Jul 2023

Publication series

NameEC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period9/07/2312/07/23

Keywords

  • auctions
  • bayes-nash equilibrium
  • online convex optimization

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