Computational aspects of shapley's saddles

Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are playing an ever increasing role in the study of systems of autonomous computational agents. A common criticism of Nash equilibrium is that its existence relies on the possibility of randomizing over actions, which in many cases is deemed unsuitable, impractical, or even infeasible. In work dating back to the early 1950s Lloyd Shapley proposed ordinal set- valued solution concepts for zero-sum games that he refers to as strict and weak saddles. These concepts are intuitively appealing, they always exist, and are unique in important subclasses of games. We initiate the study of computational aspects of Shapley's saddles and provide polynomial-time algorithms for computing strict saddles in normal-form games and weak saddles in a subclass of symmetric zero-sum games. On the other hand, we show that certain problems associated with weak saddles in bimatrix games are NP-hard. Finally, we extend our results to mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles introduced by Duggan and Le Breton. Categories and Subject Descriptors F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems; 1.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Sys-tems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences- Economics General Terms Theory, Algorithms, Economics.