Complexity of strong implementability

We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice. This is one of the central questions in mechanism design. If the concept of weak implementation is considered, the Revelation Principle states that one can restrict attention to truthful implementations and direct revelation mechanisms, which implies that implementability of a social choice function is “easy” to check. For the concept of strong implementation, however, the Revelation Principle becomes invalid, and the complexity of deciding whether a given social choice function is strongly implementable has been open so far. In this paper, we show by using methods from polyhedral theory that strong implementability of a social choice function can be decided in polynomial space and that each of the payments needed for strong implementation can always be chosen to be of polynomial encoding length. Moreover, we show that strong implementability of a social choice function involving only a single selfish individual can be decided in polynomial time via linear programming.