Castor: Scalable secure routing for ad hoc networks

Wojciech Galuba, Panos Papadimitratos, Marcin Poturalski, Karl Aberer, Zoran Despotovic, Wolfgang Kellerer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

45 Scopus citations

Abstract

Wireless ad hoc networks are inherently vulnerable, as any node can disrupt the communication of potentially any other node in the network. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. In this paper, we take a fresh and comprehensive approach that addresses simultaneously three aspects: security, scalability and adaptability to changing network conditions. Our communication protocol, Castor, occupies a unique point in the design space: It does not use any control messages except simple packet acknowledgements, and each node makes routing decisions locally and independently without exchanging any routing state with other nodes. Its novel design makes Castor resilient to a wide range of attacks and allows the protocol to scale to large network sizes and to remain efficient under high mobility. We compare Castor against four representative protocols from the literature. Our protocol achieves up to two times higher packet delivery rates, particularly in large and highly volatile networks, while incurring no or only limited additional overhead. At the same time, Castor is able to survive more severe attacks and recovers from them faster.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2010 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
EventIEEE INFOCOM 2010 - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: 14 Mar 201019 Mar 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Conference

ConferenceIEEE INFOCOM 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period14/03/1019/03/10

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