Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates

For many election systems, bribery (and related) attacks have been shown NP-hard using constructions on combinatori-ally rich structures such as partitions and covers. It is important to learn how robust these hardness protection results are, in order to find whether they can be relied on in practice. This paper shows that for voters who follow the most central political-science model of electorates-single-peaked preferences-those protections vanish. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial covering challenges, we show that NP-hard bribery problems-including those for Kemeny and Llull elections-fall to polynomial time. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial partition challenges, we show that NP-hard partition-of-voters problems fall to polynomial time. We furthermore show that for single-peaked electorates, the winner problems for Dodgson and Kemeny elections, though ⊖₂^p-complete in the general case, fall to polynomial time. And we completely classify the complexity of weighted coalition manipulation for scoring protocols in single-peaked electorates.