Blue versus red: Towards a model of distributed security attacks

Neal Fultz, Jens Grossklags

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

42 Scopus citations

Abstract

We develop a two-sided multiplayer model of security in which attackers aim to deny service and defenders strategize to secure their assets. Attackers benefit from the successful compromise of target systems, however, may suffer penalties for increased attack activities. Defenders weigh the force of an attack against the cost of security. We consider security decision-making in tightly and loosely coupled networks and allow defense expenditures in protection and self-insurance technologies.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFinancial Cryptography and Data Security - 13th International Conference, FC 2009, Revised Selected Papers
Pages167-183
Number of pages17
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event13th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2009 - Accra Beach, Barbados
Duration: 23 Feb 200926 Feb 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5628 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference13th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2009
Country/TerritoryBarbados
CityAccra Beach
Period23/02/0926/02/09

Keywords

  • Economics of Security
  • Game theory
  • Protection
  • Self-insurance
  • Tightly and loosely coupled networks

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