Abstract
We characterize optimal R&D strategies in a model where an incumbent and a startup with no possibility to enter the market choose both investment level and radicalness of their R&D projects. The incumbent commercializes the most valuable project, and, where necessary, acquires the startup. The startup has two locally optimal strategies: A “high quality” and a “low cost” strategy where it aims for having the most valuable and the only successful R&D project, respectively. The struggle for rents inside the innovation system results in an inefficient portfolio of projects compared to the R&D choices that a monopolist would make.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 107024 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 234 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2025 |
Keywords
- Game theory
- Markets for technology
- R&D competition
- Startup
- Technology acquisition
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