Artificial Intelligence and Collusion

Francisco Beneke, Mark Oliver Mackenrodt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

38 Scopus citations

Abstract

The debate over whether, in the absence of overt communications, mere tacit coordination between competitors should be outlawed is neither new nor settled. Current technological developments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) have added further complexity to the discussion, which has given rise to many works that explore the effects of the use of AI-powered pricing software on competition. This paper attempts to contribute to the debate by addressing some issues not covered in previous works. First, there are risks to consumer welfare associated with AI pricing software’s capacity to solve uncertainty (for example, supra-competitive equilibria may not be disrupted by changes in demand). Second, the use of artificial neural networks can make detection of anticompetitive pricing patterns more difficult. On the other hand, if authorities can harness the power of the technology themselves, detection problems could be alleviated. Third, the black box argument may not be a problem in this application of artificial neural networks since the pricing software industry has been able to develop more transparent algorithms in response to market demands. Finally, the use of AI pricing software brings some changes to the debate on the feasibility of remedies to mere interdependence, although more work needs to be carried out in this area.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)109-134
Number of pages26
JournalIIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
Volume50
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 15 Jan 2019
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Artificial intelligence
  • Competition law
  • Concerted practices
  • Oligopoly theory
  • Pricing algorithms
  • Tacit collusion

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