TY - GEN
T1 - Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?
AU - Öz, Burak
AU - Sui, Danning
AU - Thiery, Thomas
AU - Matthes, Florian
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Burak Öz, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Florian Matthes.
PY - 2024/9
Y1 - 2024/9
N2 - The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90 % of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80 % of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To foster competition and preserve Ethereum’s decentralized ethos and censorship resistance properties, understanding the dominant players’ competitive edges is essential. In this paper, we identify features that play a significant role in builders’ ability to win blocks and earn profits by conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis of MEV-Boost auctions over a six-month period. We reveal that block market share positively correlates with order flow diversity, while profitability correlates with access to order flow from Exclusive Providers, such as integrated searchers and external providers with exclusivity deals. Additionally, we show a positive correlation between market share and profit margin among the top ten builders, with features such as exclusive signal, non-atomic arbitrages, and Telegram bot flow strongly correlating with both metrics. This highlights a “chicken-and-egg” problem where builders need differentiated order flow to profit, but only receive such flow if they have a significant market share. Overall, this work provides an in-depth analysis of the key features driving the builder market towards centralization and offers valuable insights for designing further iterations of Ethereum block auctions, preserving Ethereum’s censorship resistance properties.
AB - The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90 % of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80 % of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To foster competition and preserve Ethereum’s decentralized ethos and censorship resistance properties, understanding the dominant players’ competitive edges is essential. In this paper, we identify features that play a significant role in builders’ ability to win blocks and earn profits by conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis of MEV-Boost auctions over a six-month period. We reveal that block market share positively correlates with order flow diversity, while profitability correlates with access to order flow from Exclusive Providers, such as integrated searchers and external providers with exclusivity deals. Additionally, we show a positive correlation between market share and profit margin among the top ten builders, with features such as exclusive signal, non-atomic arbitrages, and Telegram bot flow strongly correlating with both metrics. This highlights a “chicken-and-egg” problem where builders need differentiated order flow to profit, but only receive such flow if they have a significant market share. Overall, this work provides an in-depth analysis of the key features driving the builder market towards centralization and offers valuable insights for designing further iterations of Ethereum block auctions, preserving Ethereum’s censorship resistance properties.
KW - Block Building Auction
KW - Maximal Extractable Value
KW - Proposer-Builder Separation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85200665893&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22
DO - 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85200665893
T3 - Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
BT - 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT 2024
A2 - Bohme, Rainer
A2 - Kiffer, Lucianna
PB - Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
T2 - 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT 2024
Y2 - 23 September 2024 through 25 September 2024
ER -