Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games

An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. First, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a contractually individually stable partition. This contrasts with previous results such as the NP-hardness of computing individually stable or Nash stable partitions. Secondly, we prove that checking whether the core or the strict core exists is NP- hard in the strong sense even if the preferences of the players are symmetric. Finally, it is shown that verifying whether a partition consisting of the grand coalition is contractual strict core stable or Pareto optimal is coNP-complete. Categories and Subject Descriptors 1.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences-Economics General Terms Theory, Economics.