TY - JOUR
T1 - Local Energy Markets*
AU - Baake, Pio
AU - Schwenen, Sebastian
AU - von Hirschhausen, Christian
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Authors. The Journal of Industrial Economics published by The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
PY - 2023/9
Y1 - 2023/9
N2 - In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long-distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local energy markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local energy markets. We show that local energy markets yield competitive equilibrium prices and provide efficient investment incentives. Yet, we find that strategic behavior leads to allocative inefficiency. We propose a clearing mechanism that induces truth-telling behavior and restores first-best welfare.
AB - In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long-distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local energy markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local energy markets. We show that local energy markets yield competitive equilibrium prices and provide efficient investment incentives. Yet, we find that strategic behavior leads to allocative inefficiency. We propose a clearing mechanism that induces truth-telling behavior and restores first-best welfare.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85168279517&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/joie.12338
DO - 10.1111/joie.12338
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85168279517
SN - 0022-1821
VL - 71
SP - 855
EP - 882
JO - Journal of Industrial Economics
JF - Journal of Industrial Economics
IS - 3
ER -