Detectability of Denial-of-Service Attacks on Arbitrarily Varying Channels with State Constraints

Sixth Generation (6G) wireless networks will become the system-critical infrastructure for the modern information society. For this reason, 6G communication schemes must fulfill resilience by design. Because of its probabilistic nature, a wireless communication link varies in the ability to transfer information from a transmitter to a legitimate receiver. Additionally, interference generated by malicious nodes performing attacks to achieve Denial-of-Service (DoS) may corrupt the communication link. The Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC) model captures this vulnerability. The network must be able to algorithmically detect a DoS attack to ensure resilience by design. We investigate the detectability of these attacks in a detection framework based on Turing computability. We show that the task of algorithmic detection of DoS attacks is infeasible when communicating over AVCs with state constraints.