Detectability of Denial-of-Service Attacks on Arbitrarily Varying Classical-Quantum Channels

Holger Boche, Minglai Cai, H. Vincent Poor, Rafael F. Schaefer

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandKonferenzbeitragBegutachtung

4 Zitate (Scopus)

Abstract

Communication systems are subject to adversarial attacks since malevolent adversaries might harm and disrupt legitimate transmissions intentionally. Of particular interest in this paper are so-called denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which the jammer completely prevents any transmission. Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels, providing a suitable model to capture the jamming attacks of interest, are studied. Algorithmic detection frameworks are developed based on Turing machines and also Blum-Shub-Smale (BSS) machines, where the latter can process and store arbitrary real numbers. It is shown that Turing machines are not capable of detecting DoS attacks. However, BSS machines are capable thereof implying that real number signal processing enables the algorithmic detection of DoS attacks.

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Titel2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2021 - Proceedings
Herausgeber (Verlag)Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Seiten912-917
Seitenumfang6
ISBN (elektronisch)9781538682098
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 12 Juli 2021
Veranstaltung2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2021 - Virtual, Melbourne, Australien
Dauer: 12 Juli 202120 Juli 2021

Publikationsreihe

NameIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
Band2021-July
ISSN (Print)2157-8095

Konferenz

Konferenz2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2021
Land/GebietAustralien
OrtVirtual, Melbourne
Zeitraum12/07/2120/07/21

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