Analyzing the practical relevance of voting paradoxes via ehrhart theory, computer simulations, and empirical data

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Martin Strobel

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandKonferenzbeitragBegutachtung

16 Zitate (Scopus)

Abstract

Results from social choice theory are increasingly used to argue about collective decision making in computational multiagent systems. A large part of the social choice literature studies voting paradoxes in which seemingly mild properties are violated by common voting rules. In this paper, we investigate the likelihood of the Condorcet Loser Paradox (CLP) and the Agenda Contraction Paradox (ACP) using Ehrhart theory, computer simulations, and empirical data. We present the first analytical results for the CLP on four alternatives and show that our experimental results, which go well beyond four alternatives, are in almost perfect congruence with the analytical results. It turns out that the CLP-which is often cited as a major flaw of some Condorcet extensions such as Dodgson's rule, Young's rule, and MaxiMin-is of no practical relevance. The ACP, on the other hand, frequently occurs under various distributional assumptions about the voters' preferences. The extent to which it is real threat, however, strongly depends on the voting rule, the underlying distribution of preferences, and, somewhat surprisingly, the parity of the number of voters.

OriginalspracheEnglisch
TitelAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Herausgeber (Verlag)International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Seiten385-393
Seitenumfang9
ISBN (elektronisch)9781450342391
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2016
Veranstaltung15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapur
Dauer: 9 Mai 201613 Mai 2016

Publikationsreihe

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (elektronisch)1558-2914

Konferenz

Konferenz15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Land/GebietSingapur
OrtSingapore
Zeitraum9/05/1613/05/16

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